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ARGUMENT I 
THE STATEMENT OF FACTS FOUND IN PLAINTIFFS' BRIEFl 
(1) POLITICIZES THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED ON THIS 
APPEAL AND (2) IS BASED ON SPECULATIVE FACTUAL AND LEGAL 
ASSUMPTIONS. 
The statement of "facts" found in plaintiffs1 Brief 
is unreliable for two reasons: (1) It politicizes the 
constitutional issues raised on this appeal, and (2) it is 
based on speculative factual and legal assumptions. 
Defendants specifically asked plaintiffs to refrain 
from politicizing the constitutional issues raised on this appeal. 
See defendants' Brief at 30-31. Unlike plaintiffs, defendants 
have no desire to debate the social, economic, and political 
vices or virtues of the Utah Firefighters Negotiations Act before 
the Court. Defendants debated the social, economic, and 
political vices and virtues of the Act before the Utah Legisla-
ture and won. That debate is ended. The constitutionality— 
not the social, economic, and political wisdom—of the Act has 
now been challenged in the judicial arena. Defendants suggest 
that argument in the judicial arena should be conducted—not 
on terms which require legislative fact-finding, policy-making, 
xFor convenience, defendants-appellants will be hereinafter 
referred to as defendants; plaintiffs-respondents will be 
hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs; the Utah Firefighters 
Negotiations Act will be hereinafter referred to as the Act 
or the Utah Act; defendants1 original Brief will be herein-
after referred to as defendants1 Brief; and plaintiffs' 
original Brief will be hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs1 
Brief. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and value judgments—but rather on terms more amenable to 
judicial management and resolution. This suggestion is 
supported by this Court's history of judicial restraint 
with respect to judicial review of. legislative enactments. 
If by any fair interpretation of the statute 
the legislation can be upheldf it is the duty of 
this Court to sustain it, even though judges may 
view the Act as inopportune or unwise, and it is 
not within the province of the judiciary to question 
the wisdom or the motives of the Legislature in 
the enactment of a statute. Thomas v. Daughters 
of Utah Pioneers, 197 P.2d 477, 499 (Utah 1948) 
(J. Latimer, concurring opinion). 
We are not concerned with considerations as to 
the advisability or the practicability of this 
Act. The question as to the wisdom of the project 
is for the legislature. As this Court has hereto-
fore stated, there is undoubtedly plenty of room 
within the limits of constitutional power for legis-
lation which may be considered by some as ill-
advised, improvident or unwise. But the legisla-
ture is the voice of the people who hold the 
plenary power of government except as limited by 
the Constitution. Great Salt Lake Authority v. 
Island Ranching Company, 414 P.2d 963, 966 (Utah 
In order to preserve the independence and the 
integrity of the three branches of government, 
it is of the utmost importance that the judicial 
[sic] exercise restraint and not intrude on the legis 
lative prerogative. It cannot strike down and 
nullify a legislative enactment unless it is 
clearly and expressly prohibited by the Consti-
tution or in violation of some plain mandate thereof. 
The Court must make every reasonable presumption 
which favors constitutionality. The Courts have a 
duty to investigate and, insofar as possible, 
discover any reasonable avenues by which the 
statute can be upheld. Every reasonable doubt 
must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality 
of the statute. Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug 
Centers, Inc., 446 F.2d 958, 962 (Utah 1968). 
See also, Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation and 
Arbitration, 352 N.E.2d 914, 921-922 (Mass. 1976). 
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Unfortunately, plaintiffs do not agree with this 
separation of powers concept or with this Court's definition 
of the judiciary's role in the context of that separation of 
powers. Instead, plaintiffs' Brief invites the Court to sub-
stitute its economic and political judgment for the Legis-
lature's economic and political judgment with respect to the 
Utah Act. 
For instance, plaintiffs emphasize that the Act 
was "passed by one vote on the last day of the 1975 general 
legislative session," plaintiffs' Brief at 5-6, and plaintiffs 
falsely represent that "officers of the plaintiff cities can 
be forced into the firefighter bargaining unit, by regular 
vote ..." (Emphasis supplied.) plaintiffs' Brief at 3. 
Likewise, plaintiffs speculate that the Act will 
not promote industrial peace and that only a "tenuous" 
relationship exists between the Act's proposed "method" 
of bargaining and improved fire protection in plaintiff 
municipalities. See plaintiffs' Brief at 32. But whether 
the Act encourages industrial peace or better fire protection 
involves an empirical judgment which this Court must presume 
that the Legislature has made favorable to the Act's passage. 
Plaintiffs' unsupported speculations cannot rebut this 
presumption. 
Finally, plaintiffs' appeal to the Court's politi-
cal instinct is illustrated by their elaborate calculation 
of the projected cost to plaintiff municipalities of adopting 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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defendants1 proposed collective bargaining contract. See 
plaintiffs1 Brief at 3-5. 
In short, the hyperbolic nature of plaintiffs' 
statement of "facts" leaves defendants no alternative but 
to expose those "facts" for what they are: speculative 
assumptions which should have no place in the adjudication 
of important constitutional issues. 
All of the "facts" stated in plaintiffs' Brief at 
3-5 UK 3-8 are subject to the following objections: 
(a) Plaintiffs assume that they are required to 
bargain with defendants relative to each of the matters 
enumerated in plaintiffs' Brief at 3-5 1M[ 3-8. This assump-
tion is essential to plaintiffs' conclusion that defendants' 
proposed collective bargaining contract will cost plaintiff 
municipalities an additional $2,896,000.00 per year. 
However, the Act requires plaintiffs to bargain 
with defendants only relative to "wages, hours, and other 
conditions of employment." Utah Code Ann. § 34-20a-3 (Supp. 
1975). Anything outside the scope of "wages, hours, and 
other conditions of employment" would not be a mandatory, 
but rather a permissive, bargaining subject. Naturally, if 
a bargaining subject is permissive rather than mandatory/ 
plaintiff municipalities will not be required to bargain 
over it, impasse will never be reached relative to that 
bargaining subject, and binding arbitration will never 
be imposed relative to that bargaining subject.2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Wages, hours, and conditions of employment" are 
terms of art in labor relations law. These terms must be 
defined by Utah's courts. Utah's courts have not yet 
defined these terms. Instead of assuming an interpretation 
of these terms as "facts" in their Brief, plaintiffs should 
await judicial interpretation of these terms by Utah's 
courts. 
(b) Even if plaintiffs are required to bargain 
with defendants relative to each subject mentioned in plain-
tiffs' Brief at 3-5 1(11 3-8, plaintiffs' statement of "facts" 
assumes that bargaining negotiations will produce no compro-
mises between plaintiffs and defendants. However, it is not 
unrealistic to assume that plaintiffs and defendants will 
reach agreements as a result of normal collective bargaining 
processes. Only when an impasse is reached will there be 
resort to arbitration; and it is likely that the potential 
of an adverse arbitration award will encourage each side to 
be conciliatory. See, e.g., A. McAvoy, "Binding Arbitration 
of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of 
Disputes in the Public Sector," 72 Col. L. Rev. 1192, 1210 
(1972). 
^For example, the manning provisions, hiring practices, and 
shift regulations discussed in plaintiffs' Brief could all 
be adjudicated outside the scope of the Act's "hours and 
conditions of employment" language; and, therefore, they would 
not be subject to the Act's mandatory bargaining and com-
pulsory arbitration provisions. Pending a definitive judicial 
resolution of this issue, plaintiffs cannot argue that the 
Act will have the economic effect detailed in their Brief. 
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(c) In addition to assuming that bargaining negotia 
tions will reach an impasse and that impasse will be reached 
with respect to every subject mentioned in plaintiffs' Brief 
at 3-5 1(11 3-8, plaintiffs1 statement of "facts" 
assumes that the arbitration board will decide every impasse 
issue in defendants' rather than plaintiffs' favor. Implicit 
in this assumption is a marked antipathy towards arbitrators 
as being biased and irresponsible, particularly in matters 
affecting city treasuries. No authority in support of such 
antipathy is offered by plaintiffs. On the contrary, many 
courts have recognized arbitration to be a time-honored, 
respected method of settling labor disputes. See, e.g., 
Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186, I.A.F.F. v. City of Vallejo, 
526 P.2d 971, 980 (Cal. 1974) ("State policy in California 
'favors arbitration provisions in collective bargaining 
agreements and recognizes the important part they play in 
helping to promote industrial stabilization.'"). See also 
defendants' Brief at 17-19. 
(d) If the arbitration board decides any impasse 
issue in defendants' favor, plaintiffs' statement of "facts" 
assumes that the arbitration board's decision will not be 
subject to judicial review for being arbitrary or capricious; 
and plaintiffs further assume that if the arbitration board's 
decision is subject to judicial review, it will not be 
modified in any respect for being arbitrary or capricious. 
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(e) Plaintiffs assume that, even though the 
arbitration board's decisions relative to "wage" disputes 
are advisory only, the Act's compulsory arbitration provi-
sion will (1) apply to many "non-wage matters" which are 
actually "wage" matters and (2) will, therefore, produce 
catastrophic economic consequences for plaintiff municipali-
ties. These consequences, according to plaintiffs, are 
tantamount to "taxation" of plaintiff municipalities "without 
representation." 
(1) By examining many of plaintiffs' "non-wage 
matters," the Court can gauge the extent of plaintiffs' 
"fact" manipulation on this appeal. For example, plaintiffs 
assert that "overtime provisions" are a "non-wage matter." 
See plaintiffs' Brief at 25. Similarly, plaintiffs assert 
that "fringe benefits, such as health and accident insurance, 
life insurance, mileage allowance, and related matters" 
are "non-wage matters." See plaintiffs' Brief at 4. 
Plaintiffs' assumption that "overtime provisions" 
and "fringe benefits" are "non-wage" matters is invalid for 
two reasons. 
First, available judicial interpretations of the 
term "wages" in labor relations law suggests that "base 
hourly rates of pay, piece rates, incentive plans, overtime 
pay, shift differentials, and severance pay ... a Christmas 
bonus paid over a period of years as a percentage of 
employees' earnings, pension plans, and insurance plans, 
profit sharing and stock purchase plans, merit wage increases, 
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and the rental of company-owned housing" all may be classified 
as "wage" matters. H. Sherman and W. Murphy, Labor Relations 
and Social Problems: Unionization and Collective Bargaining 
120-121 (1975). If Utah's courts follow this expansive defi-
nition of "wages," plaintiffs' argument that "overtime 
provisions" and "fringe benefits" are "non-wage matters" 
and that, therefore, an arbitration board's decisions relative 
to these matters are binding on plaintiff municipalities 
loses its shock value entirely. 
Second, "wages" is a term of art in labor relations 
law and, therefore, its scope must be defined by Utah's 
courts and not ex cathedra by plaintiffs in their Brief. 
Until Utah's courts have spoken on this issue, it is unfair 
for plaintiffs to speculate that any particular bargaining 
subject may or may not involve a "wage" matter and, therefore, 
may or may not invoke the Act's compulsory arbitration 
provision. 
(2) Regulatory statutes such as the Utah Act do 
not constitute tax measures. The opinion of Justice Levin 
in Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 412, I.A.F.F. ' 
v. City of Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. 1975) (according to 
plaintiffs' counsel "perhaps the best reasoned, researched 
and written opinion of any case discovered by the writer," 
see plaintiffs' Brief at 17), notes that: 
The City additionally contends that the 
challenged Act "indirectly but undeniably, 
surrenders the power to tax" in violation 
of the following constitutional prohibition: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"The power of taxation shall never be surrendered, 
suspended, or contracted away." [Citation omitted.] 
The City premises that wage and benefit increases 
for policemen and firemen can only be paid by the 
imposition of new taxes. "Accordingly, the power 
to grant such pay increases includes the power to 
increase taxes." The orders of the arbitration 
panels do not in terms require an increase in taxes. 
Assuming the predicate of the City's argument, 
that existing revenues are insufficient to fund 
the cost of the increases in compensation and 
benefits awarded, the orders can be read as con-
templating either an increase in taxes or a decrease 
in municipal expenditures. Be that as it may, 
implicit in the power conferred by the Constitu-
tion on the Legislature to "resolve" disputes 
concerning public employees is legislative power 
to require, if need be, a public employer to 
provide the necessary funds ... . The consti-
tutional prohibition against surrender of the 
power of taxation has not been violated. Id. 
at 230. 
The Washington Supreme Court has also noted that: 
Spokane first relies upon [a constitutional pro-
vision] which states the Legislature has no power 
to tax cities for municipal purposes. Spokane 
contends that since [Washington's compulsory 
arbitration law] will have the effect of imposing 
additional expenses upon it in the form of increased 
wages for uniformed personnel, the section violates 
this constitutional provision. We cannot agree. 
First, [Washington's compulsory arbitration law] 
does not impose a tax. [Citation omitted.] "Taxes 
are defined to be 'burdens or charges imposed 
by a legislative authority on persons or property, 
to raise money for public purposes, or more 
briefly, an imposition for the supply of the 
public treasury.'" [Washington's compulsory 
arbitration law], although it may result in the 
need for local taxation, does not itself impose any 
"burden or charge." [Citation omitted.] In 
addition, if the primary purpose of legislation 
is regulation rather than raising revenue, the 
legislation cannot be classified as a tax even if 
a burden or charge is imposed. [Citation omitted.] 
City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, 553 P.2d 
1316, 1318-1919 (Wash. 1976). 
(The compulsory arbitration statutes in both Dearborn and 
Spokane, unlike the Utah Act, provided for compulsory arbitration 
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relative to "wages" as well as other subjects of collective 
bargaining.) 
In short, plaintiffs1 argument that the Utah Act 
will indirectly impose "taxation without representation" 
on the residents of plaintiff municipalities fails to make 
the obvious distinction between legislative power to regu-
late and legislative power to tax. 
Defendants submit that the foregoing analysis 
thoroughly discredits the statement of "facts" found in 
plaintiffs' Brief. Defendants further submit that the 
judicial decision-making process is not well served by "fact" 
statements representing one litigant's politicized version 
of the economic wisdom of legislation under constitutional 
attack. 
ARGUMENT II 
NEITHER FIREFIGHTER/CITY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
NOR COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF FIREFIGHTER/CITY COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING DISPUTES CONSTITUTE MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS AND, 
THEREFORE, THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT DOES NOT 
VIOLATE UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VI § 28.3 
(1) Plaintiffs have confused their Utah Consti-
tution, Article VI § 28 argument with other constitutional 
arguments. 
JThis Article VI § 28 issue will be hereinafter referred to 
as the Article VI § 28 issue, the "home rule" issue, or the 
municipal autonomy issue. 
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The primary issue in the present case is whether 
firefighter/city collective bargaining or compulsory arbi-
tration of firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes 
involve "municipal functions" within the meaning of Utah 
Constitution, Article VI § 28. See defendants1 Brief at 3. 
However, plaintiffs1 Brief suggests that, because the Act 
delegates legislative authority to a "politically unaccount-
able" arbitration board and because "adequate standards" 
do not accompany this delegation, the Act violates Article VI 
§ 28. This interposition of "political accountability" 
and "adequate standards" arguments relative to Article VI 
§ 28's "municipal function" language is both inappropriate 
and confusing.4 
4This same confusion has led plaintiffs to misapprehend and, 
therefore, mischaracterize certain arguments in defendants1 
Brief. For example, plaintiffs accuse defendants of mis-
citing City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Association, 
304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973). According to plaintiffs, the com-
pulsory arbitration statute in Biddeford unconstitutionally 
delegated State legislative power. See plaintiffs1 Brief 
at 20 n.3. However, a unanimous, not a "badly divided," 
court in Biddeford ruled that compulsory arbitration of teacher/ 
school board disputes did not involve an unconstitutional 
interference with local prerogatives. See ]Cd. at 388 ("All 
justices concurring in Part I of opinion of Weatherbee J."). 
This was obviously the point for which defendants cited the 
Biddeford case. Similarly, plaintiffs accuse defendants of 
misciting Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 412, 
I.A.F.F. v. City of Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. 1975). 
See plaintiffs' Brief at 17. However, the Dearborn Court 
unanimously upheld the Michigan compulsory arbitration statute 
against "home rule" constitutional attack. See Id., at 226 
("The Supreme Court held that ... the [compulsory arbitration] 
statute does not unconstitutionally divest home rule cities 
of their constitutional powers; and that the statute does 
not surrender the power to tax to the arbitrators in violation 
of the constitutional prohibition against the power of taxation 
being 'surrendered, suspended, or contracted away1"). Since 
defendants' Brief focused exclusively on the Article VI § 28 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Article VI § 28 does not qualify its prohibition 
against State interference in municipal affairs with any 
"political accountability" or "adequate standards" rationale. 
On the contrary, this prohibition is absolute: 
The Legislature shall not delegate to any [not 
just politically accountable] special commission 
... any power [not just standardized power] to 
... interfere with any municipal functions. (Emphasis 
supplied.) Utah Constitution, Article VI § 28. 
For example, plaintiffs would undoubtedly raise 
Article VI § 28 objections to State interference with local 
property taxation—whether such interference was made by 
politically accountable or unaccountable agencies. 
Similarly, plaintiffs1 "adequate standards" argu-
ment is based on plaintiffs' failure to distinguish between 
Article VI § 28fs reference to State delegation of municipal 
legislative power to special commissions and State delega-
tion of State legislative power.5 
Defendants admit that issues presented by Article VI 
§ 28's "municipal function" language, "political account-
ability" and "adequate standards" are important issues, but 
these issues should be dealt with separately. Separate 
"home rule" constitutional challenge, defendants are frankly 
bewildered by plaintiffs' mischaracterization of defendants' 
argument and by plaintiffs' failure to ascertain the correct 
holding of cases such as Biddeford and Dearborn with respect 
to the "home rule" issue. 
5Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to allege an unconsti-
tutional delegation of State legislative power and this 
issue was not argued in the lower court. Plaintiffs are, 
therefore, improperly raising this issue on appeal. See 
defendants' Reply Brief, infra at Argument IV. 
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treatment will add clarity to the debate over these issues and 
will facilitate responsible redrafting of the Act in the event 
the Act is found to be constitutionally deficient in any 
particular respect. 
(2) Cases cited by plaintiffs in support of their 
assertion that the Act violates Utah Constitution, Article VI 
§28 are not compelling. 
Defendants proceed to a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction 
review of the "home rule" constitutional question as it 
relates to firefighter/city collective bargaining and to 
compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collective bar-
gaining disputes. For convenience, defendants adopt the order 
of jurisdictions used in plaintiffs1 Brief. 
(a) Washington. Plaintiffs point to Washington 
as a jurisdiction which disallows firefighter/city collective 
bargaining and compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city 
collective bargaining disputes. Plaintiffs rely in this 
regard on State v. Johnson, 278 P.2d 662 (Wash. 1955). See 
plaintiffs' Brief at 10-12. Defendants have already dis-
tinguished the Johnson case on two grounds: (1) Whereas 
Utah Constitution, Article VI § 28 proscribes only State 
interference in municipal affairs, Johnson involved a 
municipality's amendment of its own charter to allow com-
pulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collective bargaining 
disputes; and (2) the charter amendment in Johnson was ruled 
invalid because the State had not granted the municipality 
power to make such an amendment. In other words, a munici-
pality's power relative to labor relations matters is conferred Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or withheld by the State of Washington as a matter of State 
and not municipal policy. See defendants' Brief at 24-25. 
Defendants' analysis of Johnson has been vindicated 
in the recent case of City of Spokane v. Spokane Police 
Guild, 553 P.2d 1316 (Wash. 1976). There, the City of Spokane 
challenged State legislation requiring Washington cities 
to submit unresolved collective bargaining disputes between 
firefighters, policemen, and cities to arbitration. Spokane 
argued that this legislation "taxed" plaintiff municipalities 
for "municipal purposes" in violation of the Washington 
State Constitution. The Washington Supreme Court rejected 
this argument on the ground that compulsory arbitration of 
firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes does not 
involve a "municipal purpose." 
If the legislative purpose is "to obtain perform-
ance of the duties promoting the general welfare 
and security of the State," the constitutional 
prohibition is inapplicable [citations omitted]. 
It is readily apparent that strikes by police and 
firefighters for any reason, which place public 
health and safety in immediate danger, are a matter 
which concerns the State at large and not merely 
a particular municipality [citation omitted]. 
Such a strike in Spokane might, for example, neces-
sitate the use of the State militia or State Patrol 
to do the police work, or the use of firefighters 
from neighboring areas to put out fires in Spokane 
[citation omitted] ... . "The preservation of 
the public peace and the like, although confided 
to local agencies, are essentially matters of public 
concern ... ." Id., at 1319. 
Turning to the question of Johnson's status as 
precedent relative to the compulsory arbitration issue, 
the Court stated flatly that Johnson: 
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... is not controlling. [Johnson] held an 
amendment to the Everett City charter, pro-
viding for arbitration of disputes between the 
firemen and the city, to be an unlawful delegation 
to the arbitrators of the authority vested ... 
[citation omitted] in the mayor and city council 
to fix wages of municipal employees. [Johnson], 
however, was decided prior to the enactment in 
1973 of the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining 
Act [citation omitted], the constitutionality of 
ivhich we uphold. The legislation in that Act not 
only made such a delegation lawful and mandatory 
by enactment of this law, but provided ... [cita-
tion omitted] that the provisions of the Act 
"shall control" in case of conflict with "any other 
statute, ordinance, rule or regulation of any 
public employer as it relates to uniformed 
employees ... ." The conflict presented in 
[Johnson] has, therefore, been eliminated ... 
[citation omitted], and what was held unlawful 
in that case is now both lawful and mandatory. 
Id. at 1320. 
See also, City of Everett v. Fire Fighters, Local No. 350 
of the International Association of Fire Fighters, 555 P.2d 
418 (Wash. 1976). 
Defendants submit that the State of Washington, 
by virtue of its Spokane decision, is following the majority 
of jurisdictions in upholding firefighter/city collective 
bargaining and compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city 
collective bargaining disputes against "home rule" constitu-
tional attacks. 
(b) California. Defendants rely on Professional 
Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 384 P.2d 153 
(Cal. 1963) as support for the proposition that firefighter/ 
city collective bargaining does not violate constitutional 
provisions concerned with municipal autonomy. See defendants1 
Brief at 10-11. Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Professional 
Fire Fighters on three grounds. 
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First, plaintiffs suggest that "the case has no 
relevance to the case before the Bar, because Salt Lake City 
is not a charter city." See plaintiffs' Brief at 20 n.3. 
Defendants are intrigued by plaintiffs' charter 
city/non-charter city distinction. If all cases involving 
charter cities are irrelevant to the present case, then most 
of the major cases relied on by plaintiffs, e.g., Greeley 
Police Union v. City Council of Greeley, 553 P.2d 790 (Colo. 
1976), State v. Johnson, 278 P.2d 662 (Wash. 1955), and City 
of Beaverton v. International Association of Fire Fighters, 
Local 1660, Beaverton Shop, 531 P.2d 730 (Ore. Ct. App. 
1975), must be judged irrelevant by plaintiffs' own standard. 
Even the case which plaintiffs cite as controlling in Cali-
fornia on the "home rule" constitutional issue with respect 
to compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collective 
bargaining disputes, San Francisco Firefighters Local 798, 
I.A.F.F., AFL-CIO v. City and County of San Francisco, 129 
Cal. Rptr. 39 (Cal Ct. App. 1976) , involves a charter city. 
The short answer to plaintiffs' charter city/non-
charter city argument is simply that nothing in the language 
of Utah Constitution, Article VI § 28 distinguishes between 
chartered and non-chartered cities: "The Legislature shall 
not [interfere with] ... any municipal improvement, money, 
property, or effects ... or ... perform any municipal function." 
(Emphasis supplied.) Defendants, therefore, conclude that 
plaintiffs' charter/non-charter city argument makes a dis-
tinction without making a difference. 
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P1 a 2 nt i f f s ' s e c o nd • j r o tin d f :i) r :! i s t I n g u i s h i n g -
Professional Fire Fighters is that: ffThis case did not 
involve binding arbitration; rather, this case involved 
the charge of discrimination, that is, the right to join or 
refrain from joining a labor organization The issues 
prjj^r/.v .-. •- .-.. Ii i i i i) ;vay similar " Plaintiffs f Brief 
at 20 
P ] a i n tiffs adm i t that Pr o fe ss ion a 1 Fire Fi ghters 
did not involve a compulsory arbitra tion Issue and that it 
did involve pablic employer discrimination against public 
employee attempts to or gai lize for col lective bargainii lg 
purposes. However, it does not follow from these admissions 
that Professiona 1 Fi re Fighters is "i n i i ID tta] r s i milar" to the 
present case. On the contrary, Professional Fire Fighters 
held that a firefighter/city collective bargaining law did 
n o t v i o 1 a t e C a 1 i f o r n i a f s f' 1 i o n > e r u 1 e '"f c o n s t i t u t ion a 1 p r o v I -
sion. This provision is virtually identical to Utah Consti-
tution , Article VI § 28. See Cali fornia Constitution, 
Article XI § 13. 
After n o t m a rr. it ~ matter of "'State-wide concern" 
does no t ii I • ^ ol\ • . x_ -.. unctioi i, : tl le Court stated that: 
Because the various sections of Article XI fail 
to define municipal affairs, it becomes necessary 
for the courts to decide, under the facts of each 
casef whether the subject matter under discussion 
is of municipal or State-wide concern. This 
question must be determined from the legislative 
purpose in each instance. In the instant case 
it would appear that the Legislature was attempting 
to deal with labor relations on a State-wide 
basis ..• . The total effect of all this legis-
•lation was not to deprive local government . of 
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the right to manage and control its fire depart-
ments , but to create uniform fair labor practices 
throughout the State. As such, the legislation may 
impinge upon local control to a limited extentf 
but it is nonetheless a matter of State concern. 
Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los 
Angeles, 384' P.2d 158, 169 (Cal. 1963). 
This Court has employed almost identical reason-
ing to define the municipal function language of Article VI 
§ 28. See Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499, 503 
(Utah 1975). This consonance of reasoning in Professional 
Fire Fighters and Tribe compel a finding that at least the 
collective bargaining provisions of the Utah Act do not 
violate Article VI § 28. 
Finally, plaintiffs suggest that the case of 
San Francisco Firefighters Local 798, I.A.F.F., AFL-CIO v. 
City and County of San Francisco, 129 Cal. Rptr. 39 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1976), provides an accurate statement of California's 
"home rule" law with respect to compulsory arbitration of 
firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes. However, 
defendants are at a loss to see the bearing which San Francisco 
has on the present case. 
First, compulsory arbitration in San Francisco 
was mandated by a contract or "memorandum agreement" between 
local firefighter unions and city officials—not by State 
legislative fiat. It is, therefore, difficult to see how 
Article VI § 28's proscription of State legislative inter-
ference would apply to the San Francisco situation. Second, 
the San Francisco Court struck down the firefighter/city 
compulsory arbitration agreement because that agreement 
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contradicted the San Francisco »:ity cl^irtei . This dilute!. 
"
frepresents the supreme law1 of the city subject only to 
conflicting constitutional provisions l an< I to pre-emptive 
State law.f" (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 44. "Pre-emptive 
State Ia-*i7 relative to compulsory arbitration of firefighter/ 
city -rv. ;--*-£'v'- a^caininq disputes was absent in San Francisco 
because California law provides that firefighter/city compulsory 
arbitration agreements "shall not 1 )e bi nding." Ici. at 41 
and 46. This theme of State predominance in the area of 
firefighter/city labor relations is underscored throughout 
the Court * .: vji:ixcn i 
"[Tjhe principle is fundamental and of universal 
application that public powers conferred upon a 
municipal corporation and its officers and agents 
cannot be delegated to others, unless so authorized 
by the Legislature or charter." (Emphasis supplied.) 
[Quoting from 2 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal 
Corporations § 10.39 (3rd ed. 1966).] ... "As a 
general rule, powers conferred upon public agencies 
and officers which involve the exercise of judg-
ment or discretion are in the nature of public 
trusts and cannot be surrendered or delegated to 
subordinates in the absence of statutory authori-
zation. " (Emphasis in original.) [Quoting iirom 
California School Employees Association v. Personnel 
Commission, 474 P.2d 436, 439 (Cal. 1975).] San 
Francisco Firefighters Local 798, I.A.F.F., AFL-
CIO v. City of San Francisco, 129 Cal. Rptr. 39, 
43 (Cal, Ct. App. 1976). 
See also, Huntington Beach Police Officers'> Association v. 
City of Huntington Beach , 129 Ca 1. Rptr. ' •* 3 , !3 n 3 (Cal. C t. 
App. 1976) ("With respect to matters of State-wide concern, 
charter cities arn subject ft :i!*i<"< r :: i^it-M by applicable 
general State law if the Legislature has manifested an intent 
to occupy the field to the exclusion of 1 ocal regulati c n 
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[Citations omitted*] Labor relations in the public sector 
are matters of State-wide concern subject to State legisla-
tion in contravention of local regulation by chartered cities 
[citing Professional Fire Fighters./ Inc. v. City of Los 
Angeles, 384 P.2d 158 (Cal. 1963) ]M).-. 
Plaintiffs cannot seriously maintain that either 
the holding or language of San Francisco supports their 
position in the present case. If anything, the Court's 
constant reference to "pre-emptive State law" in the fire-
fighter/city labor relations field intimates support for 
defendants1 argument that compulsory arbitration of fire-
fighter/city collective bargaining disputes is a matter of 
State-wide and not merely local concern and, therefore, 
does not violate Article VI § 28. 
(c) Oregon. Plaintiffs' Brief at 14 incorrectly 
states that an Oregon Court of Appeals decision "struck down" 
the Oregon statute authorizing compulsory arbitration of 
firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes on "home 
rule" constitutional grounds. See City of Beaverton v. 
International Association of Firefighters, Local 1660, 
Beaverton Shop, 531 P.2d 730 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975). Defendants 
concede that the Beaverton Court used language broad enough 
to declare the arbitration statute unconstitutional. However, 
Beaverton1s actual holding was as follows: 
Clearly the 1973 labor relations legislation 
deals with many matters which are predominantly 
of local concern. It may also, although we need 
not make that determination here, deal with matters 
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which under [State ex rel. Eeinig v. City of 
Milwaukie, 373 P.2d 680 (Ore. 1962)] are pre-
dominantly matters of State concern. ... This 
holding does not prevent PERB from examining the 
[municipal] ordinance section by section under 
the powers granted to it by [the 1973 labor relations 
legislation] and holding invalid those provisions, 
if any, which purport to govern matters of predomi-
nantly State-wide concern and which are in con-
flict with the provisions of the 1973 Act. Id., at 
736-737. 
The iriccnclu:?iT^ nature M! Btjuvoiton ' s holding ' .us 
emphasized fay the Washington Supreme Court in City of Everett 
v. Firefighters, Local No. 350 of the International Associa-
tion of Firefighters, 555 P.2d 418 (Wash. 1976): 
The only remaining authority cited [City of 
Beaverton v. International Association of Fire-
fighters , Local 1660, Beaverton Shop, 531 P.2d 
730 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975)] is not helpful to the 
city. The Court there held that the fact that 
a city ordinance dealt with matters which were 
covered by a State statute governing labor relations 
(and providing for compulsory arbitration) iid not 
render it totally invalid. Rather, the Court 
decided the ordinance should be upheld to the extent 
that it dealt with matters of purely local concern. 
which were not covered by the State law, Ld. at 4J", 
Not only does Beaverton1s remand to the Oregon 
Public rJrr.^ cyment Relations Board dilute Beaverton1 s impact, 
but also Beaverton's rationale would support a ruling favor-
able to defendants in the present: erase, Thi is , the Beaverton 
Court noted that: 
". . . [the] legislative assembly does not have 
the authority to enact a law relating to city 
government ... unless the subject matter of the 
enactment is of general concern to the State as 
a whole, that is to say that it is a matter of more 
than local concern to each of the municipalities 
purported to be regulated by the enactment." 
City of Beaverton v. International Association 
of Firefighters; Local 1660, Beaverton Shop, 531 
-21-
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P.2d 730, 734 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975) quoting from 
State ex rel. Heinig v. City of Milwaukie/ 373 
P.2d 680, 683 (Ore. 1962). * 
This reasoning is similar to this Court's definition 
of Article VI § 28* s municipal function language in Tribe v. 
Salt Lake City Corp. , 540 P.2d 499', 503 (Utah 1975). If a 
localized phenomenon such as the "urban blight" involved in 
Tribe can be a matter of State-wide concern, then certainly 
firefighter/city labor relations is a matter of State-wide 
concern also. The Beaverton opinion seemingly acknowledges 
this fact when it notes that: "The preservation of order, 
the enforcement of law, the protection of life and property, 
and the suppression of crime are attributes of State sovereignty 
and matters of State-wide concern ... ." City of Beaverton v. 
International Association of Firefighters, Local 1660, 
Beaverton Shop, 531 P.2d 730, 736 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975). 
Beaverton's failure to carry this premise to its 
logical conclusion, i.e., that firefighter/city labor relations 
matters affect the "preservation of order" and the "protection 
of life and property" and are, therefore, matters of State-
wide concern, is the result of two unfortunate Oregon Supreme 
Court decisions. See State ex rel. Heinig v. City of Milwaukie, 
373 P.2d 680 (Ore. 1962) (ruling State statute establishing 
civil service commission for city firemen unconstitutional 
on "home rule" grounds) and Branch v. Albee, 142 P. 598 (Ore. 
1914) (declaring State pension plan for city policemen 
unconstitutional on "home rule" grounds). 
-22-
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' • • Defendants are confi dent that, i n 1 ight of the 
Tribe opinion, this Court woul d not follow authorities such '• 
a s He in.i a1 o r Branch wi th 11 1 ei r :::oncoi ni tan11 y unreal i s tic 
affect. See defendants1 Brief at 2 8-30. 
(d) Colorado • P1 ai nt I f fs :::i te 11: ie case of Greeley 
Police Union v. City Council of Greeley, 5 33 P.2d 79 0 (Colo, 
1976) in support of their assertion that compulsory arbitra-
t ion of f ire f i ghte r / c i ty co11ec tive bargaining disputes 
violates "home rule'1 constitutional provisions. See plain-
tiffs1 Brief at 3 6-1 1 The Greeley opinion does all/ode I: .c a 
"home rule'1' constitutional provision similar to Utah Consti-
tution, Article VI § 28. See Greelev Police Union v, "i ^ 
Council of Greeley , 5 j 3 P. Jcf ? 9 ) , 7 ? 2 {Co 1 o . 19 76). This 
provision, like Article VI § 28, proscribes State legisla-
tive inte r*<•*renc f- i n ;niin ici\'a 1 af f ai r'». , "I\i)we vei , ±n Greeley 
the city amended its own charter to allow compulsory arbi-
tration oc ^irefighter/cit^ collective bargair--; -•!--'r;pf, 
•-t- __.- . r*3 is r.\ 7tate legislation i m Colorado] 
concerning the rights cf public employees ~c enoage :. r coilec-
cive bare'-;":*' . - • * •.. " •.• c n a z
 L L U L ^  Ox L Q . y i >.; v i. -
^ions are ir.applicdjle to the; Greeley situation. This in-
applicability c:ir N- : I I»^ +-*-2te-l h^ contrasting plaintiffs' 
ar;ur.tc. • ';. -r ^.*TCM. I—• ;:;. the c:* ' - arguments in 
Greeley, Plaintiffs here can invoke Article T;JI s 28 by 
showing that compulsory dr-hf:ratio!! n+ f.--- f. t.it^ r 'ci ty 
collective bargaining disputes is a .matter of local and not 
State-wide concern. See Tribe v. Salt Lake. City Corp., 54 0 
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P.2d 499, 503 (Utah 1975). However, the city in Greeley 
argued "that the charter amendment [authorizing compulsory 
arbitration of firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes] 
involves a matter of State-wide concern which is not properly 
subject to municipal regulation." Greeley Police Union v. 
City Council of Greeley, 533 P.2d 790# 791 (Colo. 1976). 
In other words, the city in Greeley was suggesting that it 
lacked authority from the State Legislature to regulate fire-
fighter/city labor relations and absent such authority it 
could not usurp what was otherwise a State legislative 
preogative. See defendants' Brief at 6-9 and Allgood v. Larson, 
545 P.2d 530, 531-532 (Utah 1976). The Greeley Court rejected 
this argument, noting that: "The city may legislate on such 
matters in the absence of conflicting statutory provisions." 
(Emphasis supplied.) Greeley Police Union v. City Council of 
Greeley, 553 P.2d 790/ 791 (Colo. 1976). This statement 
obviously implies that, if the Colorado State Legislature did 
enact firefighter/city labor relations legislation, such 
legislation would prevail over conflicting local practice. 
This implication is reinforced by Chief Justice Pringle's 
dissent: "In my view, it is a matter of local concern as 
to how a home rule city will determine its wages for police-
men." Id. at 793. Chief Justice Pringle's dissent would be 
anomalous if the majority opinion in Greeley had held that 
firefighter/city labor relations involve "municipal functions," 
as defined in Tribe, and are, therefore, not subject to State 
regulation.6 Defendants, therefore, conclude that plaintiffs' 
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i-' -,^  <• ^e'-l--" ^3* lz..*-l. .- - . - Greeley 
rationale is ::. diametric opposit -:~i *c ~ e ocsitior; olair-
tiffs must take re-3t-- • -~ ~* — ^ - •-: . r --.:. -
case. Once again > ,aintiffs have looked -nly superficially 
to . C:urt'.r :c;~clusior. :" jt a con-».r -^ *--* arbitration st^~;rte 
is . r.-. , : .- . r.a ^ .. . h^v^ over- *c/^3 - u° Court's reason for 
arriving at that conclusion.'' 
{P i v i ch i gan , P! a i nt i f f;: *' Hr i e :" il J ' -ire u • eb 
defendants of misciting Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, Local 
No. 412, I.A.F.F. v. City of Dearborn, 2 31 J.W.IM 2?n (Mich. 
19 7 5) "as ijthority for tne proposition that binding and 
compulsory arbitration has been upheld , ^a/eve:, 
defendant'- ilji.l not r:A n the Dearborn case ' • .r the proposi-
tion that binding and compulsory arbitration has been 
upheld ... . " The context of defendants1 ir — -. --:-} ;v 
bPlaintiffs' Brief at 17 n.2 unwittingly accepts defendants1 
argument in this regard. Plaintiffs observe that Greeley 
"cites Huff [v. Mayor and City Council of Colorado Springs, 
512 P.2d 632 (Colo. 1973)] and notes no conflict between it 
and its 1976 decision." This absence of conflict is 
attributable to Huff's and Greeley's acceptance of defendants' 
argument in the present case that firefighter/city labor 
relations do not involve "municipal functions," as that term 
is interpreted in Tribe, within the meaning of Article VI 
§ 28. "While we do not conclude that the city of Colorado 
Springs has no interest in pension plans for city firemen, 
we do not hesitate to characterize firemen's pensions as being 
of State-wide concern as well. We begin by recognizing that 
the protection of property generally, of which fire protec-
tion is an obvious example, is of basic and fundamental 
importance to all citizens of the State and the general public 
has a vital interest in the quality and reliability of that 
protection, [Citations omitted.] Colorado Springs itself 
recognizes that adequate fire protection is not solely of 
local concern when it enters mutual assistance agreements 
with areas outside its city limits to provide fire protection 
services.11 Id. at 634, See also defendants' Brief at 16. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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reveals that Dearborn was cited for the proposition that 
firefighter/city collective bargaining and compulsory arbi-
tration of firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes 
are not "municipal functions" and, therefore, do not violate 
"home rule" constitutional provisions. While split on other 
issues, the Dearborn Court unanimously supports defendants' 
Article VI § 28 argument. See Id. at 226 ("The Supreme Court 
held that ... the compulsory arbitration statute does not 
unconstitutionally divest home rule cities of their constitu-
tional powers; and that the statute does not surrender the 
power to tax to the arbitrators in violation of the consti-
tutional prohibition against the power of taxation being 
'surrendered, suspended, or contracted away.'"). See also, 
Pontiac Police Officers Association v. City of Pontiac, 246 
'The Greeley opinion also supports defendants' contention 
that the collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration 
provisions of the Utah Act are severable. See Greeley 
Police Union v. City Council of Greeley, 553 P.2d 790, 
792-793 (Colo. 1976). The Court recognized that collective 
bargaining and compulsory arbitration involve functionally 
dissimilar processes. Thus, in a companion case to Greeley, 
the Court contrasts these processes: "The defect in the 
board's position that the subject [collective bargaining] agree 
ment constitutes an unlawful delegation of authority and 
places control of a school system in the hands of an employee 
organization reflects a basic misperception of the negotia-
tions process. Negotiations between an employer and an 
employee organization entered into voluntarily ... do not 
require the employer to agree with the proposals submitted 
by employees. Rather, the ultimate decisions regarding 
employment terms and conditions remain exclusively with 
the board. While the employees' influence is permitted 
and felt, the control of decision-making has not been abro-
gated or delegated." (Emphasis in original.) Littleton 
Education Association v. Arapahoe County School District, 
553 P.2d 793, 796 (Colo. 1976). 
-26-
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N.W,2d 833 (Mi ch. 1976) (city's State-imposed duty to 
bargain collectively with respect to police-city grievance 
procedures does not frustrate city's exercise of its consti-
tutional "home rule1" powers) . 
Even plaintiffs 1 suggestion that compulsory arbi-
t r a t i o n o f f I r e f i g 1 I t e r, ' c i t y c o 1 1 e c t i ; e b a i: g a i n i n g d i s p u t e s 
was held to be per se unconstitutional on other grounds in 
Dearborn stretches the truth. See Dearborn Fire Fiahters 
r. .- T. i r„„ „ . - | I, - ' • • I Illli , .«„—*„,: •- . 
Union, Local No. 412 I.A.F.F. v. City of Dearborn, 231 
N.W.2d 226, 243 (Mich, :*>-'* \ \ /avanagh, concurring 
opinion) ("I hav^ i-: -: _-....•- ,--. - . .-HC .se I 
am satisfied that he has correctly stated the law, " write 
separately r to emphasize the observation he makes. A L least 
as long as the law prohibiting public employees from striking 
is maintained, some form of compulsory arbitration is a 
c o n s t i t u t i o i I a 1 1 y p e r in i s s i b 1 e d e v i c e t :> p r o v i d e £ o r t h e 
settlement of disputes between such employees and their 
employers. " ) . 
Unfortunately, plaintiffs 1 confusion with respect 
t o
 D^a^korr.T s discussion of the "home rule11 issue has resulted 
i . .-•:..: . • ':: . : i_ ;..rehensioi i of defend,' a,i its f Artie3 e ^ ;rT § 28 
argument, 
'-' Massachusetts. The recent case of Town of 
Arlington v, Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, 352 
N•E•2d 9 3 4 (Mass. 19 76) further supports defendants f conten-
ti DTi that fire fig! iter '"ci tv col lecti ve bargaining and compu 1 sory 
- 2 7 -
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arbitration of firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes 
does not violate "home rule" constitutional provisions. 
In Arlington/ plaintiff municipalities sought a 
declaratory judgment that the compulsory arbitration statute 
governing firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes 
in Massachusetts was unconstitutional. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Court framed the issue for decision as follows: 
"Does the Act, in providing for binding arbitration for 
policemen and firefighters, violate the Home Rule Amendment 
to the Massachusetts Constitution in that it removes all 
decision-making power with regard to those services from the 
municipality?" Id. at 916. 
Answering this question in the negative, the Court 
stated: 
[The Home Rule] amendment, while providing the 
broad grant of governmental powers referred to 
above, limits the municipal exercise of those 
powers to acts which are "not inconsistent with the 
Constitution or laws enacted by the General Court 
[State Legislature] in conformity with powers 
reserved to the General Court ... . The General 
Court shall have the power to act in relation to 
cities and towns ... by general laws ... ." It 
is no longer subject to debate that the General j 
Court has the power to legislate in the area of 
municipal wages and benefits .... We have made it 
plain ... [citations omitted] that in case of 
inconsistency or conflict a local ordinance or 
bylaw must give way as in these cases where a 
general law has been enacted by the General ."< 
Court ... . ^d. at 918. 
Thus Massachusetts has entered that column of 
jurisdictions which have upheld statutes similar to the Utah 
Act against "home rule" constitutional challenges. See also, 
defendants1 Brief at 6-9 and Allgood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 530, 
531-532 (Utah 1976). 
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(3) Conclusion, Since the declarations of TJcah 
? c n ^ r - r - >-l\c- outlined in defendants 1 Brief at 4-6 
and "he Tribe rationale are essentially di spositive of the 
"home rule" issue, defendants suspect th^t case Lav ;-n c m s 
issue from, other jurisdictions I las 1 i mit-- i ..:*•; " 
present case. Nevertheless, i in should be noted that ~::e 
vast majori ty of j i Iri sdi cti ons has upheId either firefighter/ 
city collective bargaining or compulsory arbitration of 
firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes against 
" home rule11 const i t u t i o n a 1 a 11 a c k s . De f e n da n t s r e s p e c t f u 11 y 
submit that the following states can be included within this 
c a t e go ry : '• ' • - I i a (co 1 1 ect i ve b ar ga i n i n g ) ; Ma i ne (collective 
bargaining anc conoulsory arbitration); Massachusetts (collective 
bargaining and conoulsory arbi tration) ; Michigan (collective 
bargaining and coripuisory arbitration) ; New York (col 1 ect I' != "e 
bargaining and cor?*;ulsory arbitration) ; Oklahoma (collective 
b a r g a i n i n g) ; Rh o d e I s 1 a n d (c o 1 1 e c t i v e b a r g a i n I n g a n d c o :mp n 3 s o r y 
arbitration;- Washington (collective bargaining and compulsory 
arbitration) ; and Wyomhn;: (collective bargaining and compulsory 
arbitration). 
Other states, ?uch as Colorado, have struck dc^r* 
c :-v-.:ul "^ ~ r : ; — : * -.* -i-*-)^ - • - :- : ^ grounds relevant 
re the Article VI i _ £* .ssua: n\c Oregon'- appellate court 
decision _s by no n.eans the final o ; d e r n i t i v e v o r ; ;r. Oregon's 
compulsory arbitration :-;-.„::;_-_., \: - v ~ _ \ : -. *•* ,:ar;:, 
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South Dakota and Pennsylvania, have invalidated compulsory 
arbitration statutes for municipal autonomy reasons* The 
Pennsylvania court's deicision on the municipal autonomy 
issue was clearly dictum and the South Dakota court does 
not provide a reasoned resolution of the compulsory arbi-
tration problem. These circumstances have prompted the 
following remark from a Utah labor relations expert: 
The sovereignty argument, as it developed in 
the United States, begins with the propositions 
that government has sole authority over all 
governmental functions and that such authority 
cannot be delegated to, usurped by, or shared 
with any other party. Thus, bargaining with, 
or striking against, government is per se 
illegal because such activity challenges the 
sovereign's exclusive right to prescribe the 
conditions under which public servants work. 
The sovereignty argument would require that 
governmental officials unilaterally establish 
public employment conditions. Similarly, the 
"illegal delegation of powers" argument provides 
that statutory authority exclusively grant 
governmental powers to government. Since the 
government is both possessor and guardian of 
governmental power, any delegation of such 
power to another party is a violation of 
statutory authority. Therefore, since collec-
tive bargaining contemplates some sharing of 
authority, government participation in negotia-
tions is per se illegal. Although the doctrines 
of sovereignty and illegal delegation of powers 
were once major factors in delaying collective 
bargaining in public employment, both doctrines 
have since been generally discredited by legal 
scholars and totally rejected by the courts. 
E. G. Gee, "Organizing the Halls of Ivy: Developing 
a Framework for Viable Alternatives in Higher 
Education Employment," 1973 Utah L. Rev. 233, 
235. 
Defendants submit that Article VI § 28 and its 
proscription against State delegation of municipal functions 
to special commissions does not apply to the Utah Act. 
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ARGUMENT III 
THE UTAH FFRKF1GHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT IS NOT 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY GROUNDS. 
Plaintiffs argue vehemently that compulsory arbi-
tration i s "incompatible v: • • • ..-_ . .:-- : • .
 ; ---.T , tv .-=• 
sentative governmer; t * M See plaintiffs1 Brief :• .•' y:otinc 
from L. Bernstei n. •-*:••'•--• - * • --'.* s-^  
Labor Relations/1 'c5 Harv. L. Rev, 45S, ;e 7 (19 71: . * 
Defendants concede that uhio argument :*as great 
emotional appeal, However, the democratic or ur:^-;-. -r 
character -;f I.IP L:ar ?.c: v.as practically no significance 
in terms - -.- constitutionality. Thus, the Ma ssa-
chusetts Supreme Court has stated: 
6
 In support of this argument, plaintiffs cite Greeley Police 
Union v, City Council of Greeley, 553 P.2d 790 (Colo, 1976) 
anc
^ Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, Local No, 412, I.A.F.F. v. 
City of Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. 1975), Greeley's"holding 
on this point is based on a unique Colorado constitutional 
provision. See Greeley Police Union v. City Council of 
Greeley, 553 P.2d 790, 792 (Colo, 1976) and Colorado Constitu-
tion, Article XXI § 4. Aside from this fact, Greeley1s pro-
fessed commitment to the tenets of political democracy is at 
best paradoxical and at worst patently hypocritical: in the 
name of "democracy" the Greeley Court struck down a city charter 
amendment which had been approved by the Greeley city elector-
ate as an initiative measure. The plurality opinion in Dearborn • 
did not declare the Michigan compulsory arbitration statute 
unconstitutional on "political accountability" grounds. On the 
contrary, both Justice Levin and Chief Justice Kavanagh indicated 
that compulsory arbitration "is a constitutionally permissible 
device to provide for the settlement of disputes between ... 
employees and their employers." Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, 
Local No. 412, I.A.F.F. v. City of Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d 226, 
243 (Mich. 1975) (C. J. Kavanagh, concurring opinion). Justice 
Levin and Chief Justice Kavanagh quarreled with the Michigan 
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The town devotes much of its Brief to what 
is essentially a challenge to the wisdom of 
the policy decisions made by the Legislature 
in enacting [the compulsory arbitration law]. 
We are referred to what is apparently a not 
insignificant collection of literature by 
scholars in the field of- labor relations 
critical of binding arbitration as a device 
for settling collective bargaining disputes, 
especially those in the public sector. 
Furthermore, the town vigorously argues that 
this particular scheme, in that it imposes a 
decision of "politically unaccountable" 
arbitrators against the wishes of popularly 
elected local government officials, is not 
consonant with the proper "exercise of political 
power in a representative democracy." While we 
do not question the respectability of the 
political philosophy articulated or the apparent 
sincerity with which it is expressed, the town 
fails to give this argument constitutional 
content. Particular political, social and 
economic beliefs, no matter how fervantly 
espoused, are not translated into constitutional 
imperatives without reference to specific 
constitutional provisions. In this opinion 
we have considered the specific constitutional 
challenges advanced by the town and found them 
insufficient to render the Act invalid. The 
further public policy arguments are of a "type ... 
regularly and properly resolved in the political 
arbitration statute because its arbitration board was composed 
on an ad hoc rather than continuous basis. Thus Justice Coleman 
noted that: "The most ardent objection is made to the [arbi-
tration] panel's tenure of office. Somehow a relatively short 
tenure is said to equal political irresponsibility. Although 
the Legislature could have established another bureaucracy, 
it chose short term panels to meet impasses immediately—no matter 
how many or where they might occur simultaneously. The duties 
do not require office work outside of the immediate arbitra-
tion activity, so a permanent staff could easily prove costly 
and unnecessary or inadequate. (There could be many or no impasses 
within a given span of time.) The Legislature also could have 
believed bias and corruption less likely to settle into these 
panels." Id. at 249 (Opinion of J. Coleman). Defendants agree 
with Justice Coleman that an arbitration board's tenure has little 
or no meaning in terms of the board's "political accountability"; 
and, indeed, the Utah Legislature could have found that tenured 
arbitration boards, like most other bureaucratic institutions, 
become entrenched and insensitive to the public needs they are 
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and legislative arenas." [Citation omitted.] 
•„. The cities and towns of the commonwealth 
do not represent a small, inarticulate or 
unsophisiticated group unable to present their 
positions to the General Court [State Legislature]. 
We suggest that the proper forum for the policy 
arguments pressed on us here is in the Legisla-
ture as it decides whether the binding arbitration 
procedures of the Act with respect to police and 
firefighter collective bargaining disputes should 
be continued and, if so, whether any modification 
should be made. Town of Arlington v. Board of 
Conciliation and Arbitration, 352 N.E.2d 9] 4, 
921 and 922 (Mass. 1976). 
The Utah Constitution, rv^ t \ lair-tiffs1 peculiar 
notions about . t; i . . . - -
 V--.- --
1
-- " reflects 
the ultimate expression of ropular vi I - ~. V~a... That Con-
stitution rrov. •>--- -nac: 
The Legislature may, by appropriate legislation 
... provide for the comfort, safety, and general 
welfare of any and all employees. Mo provision 
of this Constitution shall be construed as a 
limitation upon the authority of the Legislature 
to confer upon any commission now or hereafter 
created such power and authority as the Legis-
lature may deem requisite to carry out the pro-
visions of this section. Utah Constitution, 
Article XVI § 8. 
See ,. * .-...--. .-ir - r: ^ 
The ir^ ah Oonstituticn also stands for the proposi-
tion that: 
Our [Utah] Legislature is directly representative 
of the people of the sovereign state, and thus 
has inherently all of the powers of government 
except as otherwise specified by the State Con-
stitution. By way of comparison, it is signifi-
cantly different in that respect from the Federal 
government, which is a government of limited 
powers that can properly do only those things within 
the scope of the powers expressly granted to it by 
the States through the Federal Constitution; whereas, 
the State Legislature, having the residuum of govern-
mental power, does not look to the State Consti-
• tution for the grant of its powers, but that 
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Constitution only sets forth the limitations on its 
authority. Therefore, it can do any act or perform 
any function of government not specifically pro-
hibited by the State Constitution* Wood v. Budge, 
374 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1962). 
See also, Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 
446 P.2d 958, 962 (Utah 1968) ("The Legislature of the State, 
which represents the people and thus the sovereign, has all 
of the residuum of power of government, except only as 
expressly restricted by the Constitution.") and Great Salt 
Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co., 414 P.2d 963, 966 
(Utah 1966) ("... there is undoubtedly plenty of room within 
the limits of constitutional power for legislation which may 
be considered by some as ill-advised, improvident or unwise. 
But the Legislature is the voice of the people who hold the 
plenary power of government except as limited by the Con-
situation") . 
In light of these fundamental principles of con-
stitutional law in Utah, it is not enough for plaintiffs to 
speculate that the Act may be "undemocratic" in character 
and, therefore, unconstitutional. The Act's "alleged violation 
of the Constitution must be of a specific provision of a 
particular article thereof." Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug 
Centers, Inc., 446 P.2d 958, 961 (Utah 1968). Moreover, the 
Act "must clearly violate some constitutional provision, and 
further, the violation must be clear, complete and unmistak-
able. " Id. 
Plaintiffs have not and cannot make this showing 
with respect to their "political democracy" argument because * 
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the people of Utah have already spoken—through Utah Consti-
tution , Article XVI § 8 and through the fundamental consti-
tutional principle of legislative supremacy—that firefighter/ 
city labor relations are to be regulated by the State Legis-
lature. Indeed, plaintiffs demonstrate their lack of commit-
ment to democratic principles when they insist that the frac-
tion of Utah's populace represented by plaintiff municipali-
ties should dictate this labor relations policy for the majority 
of Utah residents who are dependent upon plaintiff munici-
palities for the preservation of property, peace, and order 
through fire protection in the State. 
ARGUMENT IV 
PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIM THAT THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS 
NEGOTIATIONS ACT'S DELEGATION OF STATE LEGISLATIVE POWER IS 
WITHOUT ADEQUATE STANDARDS AND IS, THEREFORE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
WAS NEITHER PLED NOR ARGUED IN THE LOWER COURT AND IS, THERE-
FORE, IMPROPERLY RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Plaintiffs' Brief at 32-35 argues that the Act's 
delegation of State legislative power to an arbitration 
board is without "adequate standards" and is, therefore, 
unconstitutional. 
However, neither plaintiffs1 Complaint nor their 
Amended Complaint alleges lack of adequate standards as a 
basis for constitutional disqualification of the Act. More-
over, in over a year's time, from the filing of their Com-
plaint until entry of the lower Court1s order granting plain-
tiffs1 motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs did not move Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to amend their Complaint in order to allege the adequate stand-
ards issue. Likewise, neither plaintiffs1 arguments in the 
lower Court nor the lower Court's order, drafted by plain-
tiffs1 counsel, granting plaintiffs1 motion for summary 
judgment mentions the adequate standards issue. 
Under similar circumstances this Court has stated: 
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the 
final settlement of controversies, requires that 
a party must present his entire case and his 
theory or theories of recovery to the trial court; 
and having done so, he cannot thereafter change 
to some different theory and thus attempt to keep 
in motion a merry-go-round of litigation. Simpson 
v. General Motors Corp., 470 P.2d 399, 401 (Utah 
1970). 
A long line of Utah cases has affirmed and reaffirmed the 
principle that matters neither raised in pleadings nor put 
in issue at lower court proceedings cannot be considered for 
the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Wagner v. Olsen, 482 
P.2d 702, 705 (Utah 1971); In re Estate of Ekker, 432 P.2d 
45, 46 (Utah 1967); Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 375 P.2d 456, 
457 (Utah 1962); Carson v. Douglas, 367 P.2d 462, 463 (Utah 
1962); Huber v. Deep Creek Irrigation Co., 305 P.2d 478, 479 
(Utah 1956); and Flemetis v. McArthur, 226 P.2d 124, 127 
(Utah 1951). Cases from other jurisdictions reflect a similar 
concern for the judicial economy and notice requirements 
which are the basis of this rule. See, e.g., Knudson v. 
Hilzer, 551 P.2d 680, 686 (Wyo. 1976) (constitutionality 
of automobile guest statute not considered when raised for 
i 
first time on appeal); Johnson v. Doran, 540 P.2d 306, 311 
(Mont. 1975) (right to jury trial issue improperly raised for Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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first time on appeal); Vaughn v. Murrayy 521 P.2d 262, 267-
268 (Kan. 1974) (challenge to constitutionality of automobile 
guest statute improperly raised for first time on appeal); 
Talps v. Arreola, 521 P.2d 206 (Wash. 1974) (constitutionality 
of possessory chattel lien statute improperly raised for first 
time on appeal); Peoples National Bank of Washington v. Peterson, 
514 P.2d 159, 162-164 (Wash. 1973) (constitutional questions 
relative to self-help and prejudgment attachment remedies 
under Uniform Commercial Code improperly raised for first 
time on appeal); and State v. Bruno, 378 P.2d 691, 698-699 
(Wash. 1963) (unlawful delegation of State legislative power 
to State Board of Education issue not considered when raised 
for first time on appeal). 
These authorities support defendants' contention 
that plaintiffs1 adequate standard argument has been improp-
erly raised on this appeal and that, therefore, the Court 
should not consider this argument in passing on the consti-
tutionality of the Utah Act. 
ARGUMENT V 
THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT DOES NOT 
DELEGATE STATE LEGISLATIVE POWER, AND, IF THE ACT DOES 
DELEGATE STATE LEGISLATIVE POWER, ADEQUATE STANDARDS ACCOM-
PANY THAT DELEGATION. 
Even if the Court considers plaintiffs1 adequate 
standards argument, this argument cannot provide a basis for 
declaring the Act unconstitutional. This is true for several 
reasons. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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First, plaintiffs1 adequate standards argument 
incorrectly assumes that the Act delegates State legislative 
power to the arbitration board. Legislative power is not 
given to the board. Instead, the board "arbitrates" firefighter/ 
city collective bargaining disputes. Arbitration is pre-
eminently a judicial or quasi-judicial and not a legislative 
function. See, e.g., Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v. 
Lake Washington Shipyards, 96 P.2d 257, 260 (Wash. 1939) 
("An arbitration proceeding is judicial in nature, and its 
basic requisite, like that of all English and American 
jurisprudence, is that persons whose rights and obligations 
are affected thereby have an absolute right to be heard and 
to present their evidences, after reasonable notice of the 
time and place of the hearing") and Produce Refrigerator Co. 
v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc, 97 N.W. 875, 876 (Minn. 
1904) ("An arbitration is a judicial proceeding, and the 
arbitrators, being alike the agents of both parties, and not 
of one party alone, are bound to exercise a high degree of 
judicial impartiality, without the slightest regard to the 
manner in which the duty was devolved upon them"). Arbitra-
tion boards do not make law in any legislative sense, see 
City of Everett v. Fire Fighters, Local No. 350 of the Inter-
national Association of Fire Fighters, 555 P.2d 418, 420 
(Wash. 1976) ("No authority is cited which holds that the 
resolution of a labor dispute by an arbitration panel consti-
tutes a law ••.") and State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local No. 
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(Wyo. 1968) ("... we find nothing which would suggest or 
indicate that ... arbitrators ... have been delegated any 
power to make laws or legislate"); and it appears that factual 
adjudications by an arbitration board would be permitted 
under Utah's version of the adequate standards doctrine. 
See Clayton v. Bennett, 298 P.2d 531, 535 (Utah 1956) (,,f[The 
Legislature] may confer upon ... administrative officers ... 
the duty of determining the question of the existence of 
certain facts upon which the effect or execution of its 
legislative policy may be dependent . . . l f l ) . See also, 
Revne v. Trade Commission, 192 P.2d 563, 567 (Utah 1948) 
("We recognize, of course, that the Legislature may properly 
delegate to some administrative body the duty of ascertaining 
the facts upon which the provisions of a law are to function 
. . .
w ) . As one commentator has recognized: "By authorizing 
and requiring collective bargaining [or even by authorizing 
a public employer to unilaterally dictate labor standards], a 
Legislature has, in fact, delegated to the public employer 
some of the power to determine wages that it formerly exercised. 
Thus, ... further delegation of power to an arbitrator is a 
logical next step." A. McAvoy, "Binding Arbitration of 
Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes 
in the Public Sector," 72 Col. L. Rev. 1192, 1205 (1972). 
Second, even if the Court determines that arbitra-
tion under the Act involves legislative as well as judicial 
functions, arbitration is a uniquely complex process and this 
complexity militates against application of the adequate 
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standards doctrine to the Act. Thus, this Court upheld the 
constitutionality of Utah's professional licensing statute 
against an adequate standards challenge because: 
... It is not to be expected that any director 
of registration would have sufficient knowledge 
of all of such occupations to prescribe the 
standards and qualifications for them, particu-
larly in view of the fact that with respect to 
some of them there is constant change. Clayton 
v. Bennett, 298 P.2d 531, 534 (Utah 1956). 
The Court noted that, under these circumstances, delegation 
of the power to prescribe appropriate standards for license 
applicants was a "convenient and desirable expedient." Id. 
Elaborating on this point, the Court quotes approvingly from 
Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1937): 
"The statute provides that the examination 
shall be before a board of practicing dentists, 
that the applicant must be a graduate of a 
reputable dental school, and that he must be 
of good moral character. Thus, the general 
standard of fitness and the character and 
scope of the examination are clearly indi-
cated. Whether the applicant possesses the 
qualifications inherent in that standard is 
a question of fact ... . The decision of that 
fact involves ordinarily the determination of 
two subsidiary questions of fact: The first, 
what the knowledge and skill is which fits 
one to practice the profession; the second, 
whether the applicant possesses that knowledge 
and skill. The latter finding is necessarily 
an individual one. The former is ordinarily 
one of general application. Kence it can,be 
embodied in rules. The Legislature itself 
may make this finding of the facts of general 
application, and by embodying it in the statute 
make it law. When it does so, the function of 
the examining board is limited to determining 
whether the applicant complies with the require-
ment so declared. But the Legislature need not 
make this general finding. To determine the 
subjects of which one must have knowledge in 
order to be fit to practice dentistry, the extent 
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of knowledge in each subject; the degree of 
skill requisite; and the procedure to be 
followed in conducting the examination—these 
are matters appropriately committed to an 
administrative board ... and a Legislature 
may, consistently with the Federal constitu-
tion, delegate to such board the function 
of determining these things, as well as the 
functions of determining whether the 
applicant complies with the detailed standard 
of fitness." Clayton v. Bennett, 298 P.2d 
531, 534-535 (Utah 1956). 
See also, Skelton v. Lees, 329 P.2d 389, 394 (Utah 1958) 
("... [the] Legislature could delegate to a properly qualified 
and constituted commission the determination of standards for 
such a profession in order to protect the interests of the 
public"), 
More recently, this Court has followed the Bennett 
rationale in upholding the Utah Air Conservation Act against 
an adequate standards attack. See Lloyd A. Fry Co. v. Utah 
Air Conservation Committee, 545 P.2d 495 (Utah 1975). The 
Fry opinion emphasized the newness, complexity, breadth, and 
specialized, evolving nature of air pollution control as a 
basis for relaxation of the adequate standards doctrine. 
"In the case before us we are involved with 
air pollution control, a subject which is 
fairly new to the law and yet more and more 
important to the public welfare. By its very 
nature it defies the establishment of precise 
standards. It involves a highly specialized 
science, and yet covers an exceedingly broad 
spectrum. It is complex and not reducible to 
easy equations, particularly in view of our 
constantly growing knowledge and understanding 
of-our environment and its effect upon our 
lives and our very existence. Recognizing 
these facts, the Legislature acted to prohibit 
or control air contamination to the extent 
possible in the interest of health and the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
enjoyment of life or property. It is true 
that the standards set forth are broad, but 
they are nonetheless adequate." Icl. at 500. 
See also, Kesler and Sons Construction Co. v. Utah State 
Division of Health, 513 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1973) ("... 
speaking generally, we do not believe a statute authorizing 
the Department of Health to promulgate regulations which are 
reasonable and purposed to protect the public health is an 
improper delegation of legislative power") and Lauren W. 
Gibbs v. Monson, 129 P.2d 887, 891-892 (Utah 1942) ("unworthi-
ness" held to be sufficient standard for canceling securities 
broker-dealer license in light of Utah Blue Sky law policy). 
Defendants submit that similar reasoning should be 
invoked to constitutionally validate the Utah Act. Arbitra-
tion involves complex factual determinations in an environ-
ment of constant economic change. It was, therefore, unneces-
sary and, indeed, it may have been imprudent, for the Legis-
lature to enumerate general findings or standards to guide the 
arbitration board in the exercise of its decision-making 
powers. Instead, the Act makes a fundamental policy determina-
tion, i.e., that impasses in firefighter/city collective 
bargaining disputes shall be resolved, not by the present 
adversary method with its potential for disruption of essen-
tial services, but by a mutual reasoned appeal to an im-
partial arbitrator. Referring disputes to such an arbi-
trator is not delegating legislative power. On the con-
trary, it represents a flexible rather than straitjacket 
approach to the implementation of policy already set by the 
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in the public sector appears to be at least as definite as 
the "reasonableness" or "worthiness" standards which have 
been tolerated by this Court in Fry and Monson. Courts from 
other jursidctions are in accord with this sentiment. See 
City of East Providence v. Local 850, International 
Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, 366 A.2d 1151f 1155 
(R.I. 1976) (legislative policy of providing firefighters 
with labor rights other than the right to strike is suffici-
ent in itself to withstand adequate standards constitutional 
attack); Harney v. Russo, 255 A.2d 560, 563 (Pa. 1969) 
(strike prevention policy sufficient to withstand adequate 
standards constitutional challenge: "To require a more ex-
plicit statement of legislative policy in a statute calling 
for labor arbitration would be sheer folly. The great advan-
tage of arbitration is, after all, the ability of the arbi-
trators to deal with each case on its merits in order to arrive 
at a compromise which is fair to both parties"); and State 
ex rel. Fire Fighters Local No. 946, I.A.F.F. v. City of 
Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 300 (Wyo. 1968) (Pragmatic "doctrine 
of necessity" employed to sustain arbitration statute with-
out any standards: "... if the Legislature sees fit to 
provide for genuine collective bargaining, an essential 
adjunct to the bargaining is a provision for unresolved 
matters to be submitted to arbitration or determined in some 
other manner"). See also, Fairview Hospital Association v. 
Public Bldg. Ser. & Hosp. Employees Union Local 113, 64 N.W.2d 
16 (1954). 
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Furthermore, the Act's use of certain terms, a 
factor which was heavily emphasized in Fry, provides guidance 
for the arbitration board. Thus, the Act employs terms such 
as "wages, hours, and other conditions of employment," see 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-20a-3 (Supp. 1975) and "good faith" 
collective bargaining, see Utah Code Ann. § 34-20a-5 (Supp. 
1975) . These terms of art in labor relations law can serve 
not only to define the scope of firefighter/city collective 
bargaining but also to ascertain whether certain firefighter/ 
city collective bargaining disputes are arbitrable. See, 
e.g., Pontiac Police Officers Association v. City of Pontiac, 
246 N.W.2d 831 (Mich. 1976) (grievance and other disci-
plinary procedures are "other terms and conditions of employ-
ment" and are, therefore, mandatory subjects of collective 
bargaining) and Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186, I.A.F.F. 
v. City of Vallejo, 526 P.2d 971, 978-980 (Col. 1974) (fire-
fighter manning procedure arbitrable insofar as it affects 
employee safety and does not impinge upon city management's 
power to direct fire prevention policy). 
Finally, defendants submit that, even assuming the 
existence of some deficiency in the Act's substantive stand-
ards, the Act has adequate procedural safeguards to prevent 
arbitrary decision-making by the arbitration board. 
In Fry, the Court pointed approvingly to a 
Pennsylvania decision which held that appeal provisions in 
an Act are a sufficient procedural hedge against arbitrary 
administrative action. 
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This concept is in accord with the view expressed 
by [1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 
§ 2.09 at 113 (1958)] that the law of delegation 
would be strengthened if the courts were to de-
emphasize statutory standards and to emphasize 
the degree of procedural safeguards. "... putting 
some words into a statute that a court can call 
a legislative standard is not a very good 
protection against arbitrariness. The protec-
tions that are effective are hearings with pro-
cedural safeguards, legislative supervision and 
judicial reivew ... ." Lloyd A, Fry Co. v. Utah 
Air Conservation Committee, 545 P.2d 495, 501 
(Utah 1975) . 
Other judicial opinions echo the Fry rationale: 
There is no constitutional requirement that all 
delegation of legislative power must be accompanied 
by a statement of standards circumscribing its 
exercise. It is true that a contrary view has 
frequently been expressed in the adjudicated cases, 
particularly the earlier ones, but the position 
taken in such cases is not defensible. It is now 
apparent that the requirement of expressed stand-
ards has, in most instances, been little more 
than a judicial fetish for legislative language, 
the recitation of which provides no additional 
safeguards to persons affected by the exercise of 
the delegated authority .... As pointed out in 
Davis on administrative lav;, the important considera-
tion is not whether the statute delegating the power 
expresses standards, but whether the procedure 
established for the exercise of the power furnishes 
adequate safeguards to those who are affected by 
the administrative action. Warren v. Marion 
County, 353 P.2d 257, 261 (Ore. 1960). 
The Act details the procedure for selection of the 
arbitration board and plaintiff municipalities are given 
substantial input relative to that selection process. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-20a-8 (Supp. 1975). Moreover, the Act is 
probably subject to the Utah Administrative Rule-making Act, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-3(1) (Supp. 1975). This means 
that the arbitration board, even an ad hoc arbitration board, 
must adopt and promulgate procedural rules. See Utah Code 
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Ann. §§ 63-46-4 (b) and (c) and 63-46-11 (Supp. 1975). The 
adequacy of these rules may be challenged in an action for 
declaratory judgment. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-9 (Supp. 
1975). And the arbitration board impliedly must write and 
publish its opinions in particular arbitration proceedings. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-4(d) (Supp. 1975). Presumably 
these opinions would be subject to judicial review. 
Since procedural safeguards alone are sufficient 
to satisfy the adequate standards doctrine, defendants submit 
that the Act is constitutionally sound on this point. 
ARGUMENT VI 
THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT DOES NOT 
VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES OF EITHER THE UTAH OR -1 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Plaintiffs argue that the Act violates equal 
protection guarantees of the Utah and United States Constitu-
tions , in that it does not extend collective bargaining and 
compulsory arbitration benefits to policemen as well as to 
firefighters. Defendants have two observations relative 
to this argument. 
(1) Plaintiffs do not have standing to raise the 
equal protection issue. The Utah Declaratory Judgment Act, 
under which plaintiffs are bringing the present action, 
requires a party to have some adversarial interest in the 
outcome of litigation before he has standing to participate 
in such litigation. See Utah Code Ann. '§§ 78-33-2 and 78-33-11. 
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(1953). Thus, in Backman v. Salt Lake County/ 375 P.2d 
756, 753 (Utah 1962), this Court held that "... a judgment 
can be rendered only in a real controversy between adverse 
parties ... [and] the interests of the parties must be 
adverse ... . [Tlhe party seeking ... relief must have a 
legally protectable interest in the controversy." See also, 
Main Parking Mall v. Salt Lake City Corp., 531 P.2d 866 
(Utah 1975), and Lyon v. Bateman, 228 P.2d 818 (Utah 1951). 
If the Act denies equal protection to anyone, it 
denies equal protection to policemen and other municipal 
employees and not to the plaintiff municipalities themselves. 
Equal protection interest in the present case, therefore, 
runs to policemen and other municipal employees and not to 
the plaintiff municipalities. If that interest is to be asserted 
through the judicial process, it must be asserted by the 
parties possessing such interest. This is the essence of 
constitutional standing requirements as well as the standing 
requirement of Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act. 
Not only are plaintiffs not policemen, but also 
plaintiffs1 interest with respect to the Act is diametrically 
opposed to the policemen's interests. See Affidavit of David 
Wesley in the Record at 192-194. Therefore, if plaintiffs 
insist on pretending to represent Utah's policemen (repre-
sentation which is both unauthorized and fraught with a 
conflict of interest) , the Court must conclude that plaintiffs 
lack standing to raise the equal protection issue because 
the police are in sympathy with and not opposed to the Act. 
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(2) The Act does not unreasonably discriminate 
between firefighters and other municipal employees. Even if 
we assume that plaintiffs can effectively represent the 
policemen's interests and if we further assume that the 
policemen's interests are adversarial relative to the Act, 
the Act does not violate equal protection guarantees of 
either the Utah or the United States Constitution, This is 
because the Act's discrimination between firefighters and 
other municipal employees is reasonable. 
In Illinois Assn, of Fire Fighters, Local 73 v, City 
of Waukegan, 226 N.E.2d 606 (111. 1967), defendant city 
challenged a non-binding arbitration provision because "the 
statute makes an unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, 
classification of municipal employees in that it affords 
firemen an arbitration procedure not available to other 
municipal employees," Id. at 607. The Court noted preliminar-
ily that: "When a legislative classification is challenged 
as violating [equal protection guarantees], the 'unreasonable-
ness and rationality of the class1 governs its validity 
[citation omitted]" and that a "'distinction in legislation 
is not arbitrary, if any state of facts can reasonably be 
conceived that would sustain it ... .'" [Citation omitted.] 
Id. at 608. Then the Court concluded that: 
So measured, the challenged statute is constitu-
tional. Statutes which make distinctions among 
public employees have frequently been sustained. 
Pensions for retired school teachers have been upheld 
against the challenge that they violated [equal 
protection guarantees] by providing to some employees 
an annuity not available to others [citation omitted]. 
The Civil Service Act was sustained against the 
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excluding them from its provisions requiring charges 
interfering as a condition to discharges [citation 
omitted]. A statute fixing minimum wages for 
firemen is valid [citation omitted]. ..• We are 
unable to say that the General Assembly's belief 
that the arbitration procedure it has provided 
will enhance the possibility of hiring and retaining 
firemen is unreasonable, or that it could not rea-
sonably conclude that the need for such a procedure 
is greater in the case of firemen than other public 
employees. The constitutional provision here 
invoked was not intended to preclude legislative 
innovation or to prevent the gradual application 
of new techniques in the solution of governmental 
problems. Id. at 608. 
The Court in Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. 
City of Los Angeles, 384 P.2d 158 (Cal. 1963) rejected a 
similar equal protection argument raised by the City of Los 
Angeles; 
Defendant ... argues that singling out firefighters 
from all other public employees is, per se, arbi-
trary, discriminatory, and without reasonable 
justification. Of course, the authority and duty 
to ascertain the facts which will justify class 
legislation lies with the Legislature and not with 
the courts [citation omitted] and the Legislature 
is vested with a wide discretion in adopting classi-
fications to which any particular statute is made 
applicable [citations omitted] and every presumption 
is in favor of its validity [citations omitted]. 
In enacting the instant labor code sections, the 
Legislature undoubtedly had in mind many logical 
distinctions between fire fighters and other public 
employees. By Government Code §§ 3500-3509, 
inclusive, it granted to all public employees 
the right to join labor unions, but therein pro-
vided that the employing agencies might except 
police from operation of the statute. No one can 
doubt that the denial of the overall benefits to 
the police was a reasonable denial of benefits and 
privileges to a class of persons charged with 
duties which might be inimicable [sic] to union 
membership. At the same time, the Legislature 
stated [citation omitted] that fire fighters should 
not be subject to the same exceptions as provided 
in the case of police. Realizing that the duties 
of fire fighters differed sufficiently from those 
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of public employees in general, and yet not suffici-
ently to except them in toto from the benefit of 
organization, the Legislature set forth their rights 
and obligations in a similar (but slightly different) 
legislative enactment [citation omitted]. It can-
not be said that the distinctions therein are any 
more arbitrary or without reasonable basis than the 
many other legislative distinctions predicated 
upon specific occupations. The arguments of 
defendant fail to recognize the rule that, when a 
legislative classification is questioned, if any 
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that 
would sustain it, there is a presumption of the exist-
ence of that state of facts, and the burden of 
showing arbitrary action rests upon the one who 
assails the class [citation omitted]. Id. at 
165-66. 
In State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 
S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969), the defendant city claimed that a ( 
statute extending "meet and confer" benefits to certain 
public employees but excluding policemen violated equal pro-
tection or special law provisions of the Missouri State * 
Constitution. The Court rejected this claim: 
With respect to the charge of arbitrary and uncon-
stitutional classification in the exclusion of
 g 
police, deputy sheriffs, highway patrolmen, national 
guardsmen, and teachers from benefits of the Act, 
it is noted that, except for teachers, the excluded 
class is that of police or those exercising police 
functions and, as such, are an appropriate classi-
fication, being sui generis [citation omitted] .... . * 
Note also that when a legislative classification is 
questioned, if any state of facts reasonably can 
be conceived that would sustain it, there is a 
presumption of the existence of that state of facts, 
and the burden of showing arbitrary action rests 
upon the one who assails the classification 4 
[citations omitted]. Id. at 43. 
In Utah, the duties, risks, and hazards of fire-
fighters are unique from other city employees. The equipment 
and training of firefighters differ from all other city 
employees. Firefighters work a twenty-four hour shift and a 
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fifty-six hour week, whereas other city employees work an 
eight hour day and a forty hour week. Often Utah cities 
enter into service contracts with other Utah cities and 
counties for the provision of fire protection to each other 
in times of emergency or disaster. There is a different 
community of interest among firefighters as compared with 
other city employees. 
Other states have approached the problem of public 
employee labor relations by first establishing a Firefighters 
Negotiation Act in order to study the impact of such legis-
lation before providing collective bargaining or compulsory 
arbitration to public employees on a broader scale. It seems 
entirely reasonable for Utah also to follow this trial-and-
error approach to collective bargaining and compulsory arbi-
tration in the public sector. 
Finally, the Salt Lake City Revised Ordinances, 
Titles 14 and 25, also delineate distinctions between fire-
fighters and other municipal employees claimed by plaintiffs 
to be "invidious" and "arbitrary" discrimination in the 
present case. Plaintiff Salt Lake City undoubtedly had some 
rational basis for creating these distinctions at the time 
it enacted said ordinances, and undoubtedly these distinctions 
were grounded in the relative necessity of the public services 
performed by firefighters as opposed to the necessity of 
services performed by other municipal employees. In other 
words, given the extremely essential character of fire pre-
vention and protection, the State here decided to establish 
-M-
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a procedural means for the settlement of labor disputes 
between cities and firefighters which would preclude or 
substantially lessen the possibility of a strike amongst fire-
fighters. The fact that the means chosen are wise or improvi-
dent, or that they may or may not be as effective as some 
other means to forestall strikes by firefighters is, of course, 
not a matter for judicial inquiry. Some rational relationship 
between the legislation and its purpose is all that is 
required in order to withstand plaintiffs1 equal protection 
challenge. 
Similarly, plaintiffs claim that the exclusion 
of fire chiefs, assistant chiefs, battalion or deputy chiefs 
captains, or lieutenants from the union negotiating team 
denies these individuals equal protection seems unfounded. 
The Act does not expressly preclude them from playing an 
active role in union politics or from participation in demo-
cratic selection of the negotiating team. In addition, 
these individuals are viewed by the city as part of the fire 
department's managerial echelon. Therefore, Utah Code 
Ann. § 34-20a-4 (Supp. 1975) represents a reasonable legisla-
tive compromise between these individuals1 need for union 
membership and plaintiffs' need to avoid embarrassment and 
hampered working relations between city officers and fire 
department management which might result from putting fire 
department management members in a confrontive, negotiating 
posture vis a vis said city officers. 
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Here again the Court must conclude that plaintiffs 
have not sustained their burden of proving the unreasonable-
ness of the Act's firefighter/city municipal employees 
classification. Plaintiffs do not cite a single authority 
which deals with factual situations similar to those found 
in the present case. Instead, plaintiffs rely on rhetorical 
flourishes to prove their equal protection point: "... the 
writer would be very interested in learning of any distinc-
tion which makes the Salt Lake City employees working in the 
fire department unique or distinguished from any other class 
of municipal employees ... ." Plaintiffs' Brief at 39. 
However, plaintiffs' idle speculation cannot rebut the Act's 
presumption of constitutionality. 
ARGUMENT VII 
THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE ONE-PERSON ONE-VOTE RULE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Plaintiffs' Brief at 42-44 argues that the Utah 
Act violates the one-person one-vote rule. However, this 
argument proceeds from a false assumption: That the 
arbitration board "has the power to compel the levying of 
taxes." See plaintiff's Brief at 42. Plaintiffs cite no 
authority in support of this assumption; and, indeed, the 
only available authority on this point is contra. See City 
of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, 553 P.2d 1316, 1318-
1319 (Wash. 1976) and Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, Local 
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No, 412, I.A.F.F. v. City of Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d 226, 230 
(Mich. 1975). 
In addition to plaintiffs' unsupported "taxation 
without representation" assumption, plaintiffs build their 
one-person one-vote argument on one fragile reed: City of 
Amsterdam v. Helsby, 362 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct. 1974). 
However, the Helsby opinion was summarily reversed in City of 
Amsterdam v. Helsby, 332 N.E.2d 290 (New York 1975). Every 
other reported decision which has considered this issue has 
rejected plaintiffs' contention. See Town of Arlington v. 
Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, 352 N.E.2d 914, 920-
921 (Mass. 1976) and Harney v. Russo, 255 A.2d 560, 563-
564 (Pa. 1969). 
Defendants conclude that plaintiffs1 one-person 
one-vote argument is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, defendants 
respectfully submit that the lower court's judgment in the 
present case should be reversed as requested by defendants 
on this appeal and that the Utah Firefighters Negotiations 
Act should be declared constitutional by this Court. 
DATED this 10th day of February, 1977. 
IRVINE SMITH & MABEY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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